This, even as press and politicians in Malaysia react with predictable offence to Mr Lee's allegations that "Malayism" was to blame for the race riots in 1964 and separation in 1965.

The positive tone domestically was set by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong two Saturdays ago, when he spoke at the Islamic Religious Council's 30th anniversary celebration.

Mr Goh paid a strong tribute to Singapore's Malay-Muslim community, thanking it for supporting Singapore's core values for more than three decades.

The timing was impeccable, as his words were carried in the Sunday papers on the same day that they ran those startling extracts about Malayan politicians instigating the ugly events of 1964-65.

The two harmonised parts -- one lauding Singapore Malay leaders, the other attacking Malaysian Malay leaders -- blended into the tune that Singaporeans were to hear more and more over the coming days.

It was melodious to minority ears, in particular, because it signalled that the Government had not forgotten that its fight in the 1960s was not on behalf of the Chinese against the minorities, but for multi-racialism against race-based politics.

The clear message rang out that Singapore's argument was not against any ethnic group, but against a political tendency.

The line was plugged consistently and vigorously, culminating at Mr Lee's 75th birthday dinner, when he recalled the commitment of Singapore's Malay leaders to multi-racialism, and was moved to tears.

Cynics might dismiss it all as political "spin": with Malaysia bound to attack the Senior Minister's account, Singapore leaders needed to ensure that they carried their own non-Chinese constituencies with them.

Even if it is all just politicking, however, it is no less significant. For one, it shows that the leadership does not take minorities' feelings lightly.

But more importantly, the net effect of the whole exercise may be more than just damage-limitation.

Informed discussion about those events of three decades ago has the potential to strengthen Singapore's multi-racialism, in two important ways.

First, the memoirs can help to invest upon Singaporeans a deeper and more emotional commitment to multi-racialism.

The multi-racial ideal has been in danger of being little more than a bland motherhood statement in the national culture -- a platitude that everyone agrees with, without necessarily being passionate about.

Mr Lee's gripping account reminds Singaporeans that the desire for multi-racial meritocracy and democracy -- "not a Malay nation, not a Chinese nation, nor an Indian nation" but a country where "everybody will have a place", to quote his words of Aug 9, 1965 -- was no incidental afterthought, but the very impulse that created the Republic.

Second, by clarifying the history of the riots and the separation, the memoirs can help to remove some of the residual suspicion that exists between the races.

Previously, the precise mechanics of those traumatic events were left vague. The cause was summarised in a single word: Race.

There was a serious drawback to this shorthand version of history.

It implied that just describing the two territories' ethnic chemistries -- one mainly Malay, one mainly Chinese -- could explain why, when put together, there was spontaneous combustion.

Missing from the equation was the catalyst -- the agent that turned possibly benign co-existence into an explosive situation.

Mr Lee's memoirs isolates that element: politicians and activists who took exploited a sensitive situation to incite trouble for their private benefit.

He notes that Singapore Malays were already different from their upcountry cousins as early as the 1940s. In an urban environment under the British who treated all races equally, the Malays here were not ingrained with anti-immigrant Malayism, he writes.

It took active instigation by those across the Causeway before there was trouble. Thus, the divisions were caused not just by Race, but, critically, also Politics, and Class.

True, Mr Lee is a firm believer in ethnic "fault lines". But he did not think it unrealistic to work for a Malaysian Malaysia.

Indeed, if not for unscrupulous political adversaries, the PAP and its allies may have succeeded in this mission, his book suggests.

He thus establishes that if Singapore and Malaysia could not be one, it was not because the different races were genetically or culturally incapable of living side by side.

This is a subtle but important refinement to the record, with profound, positive implications for multi-racialism in Singapore.

The old thinking invites mutual suspicion, with minorities sometimes nervous about Chinese Singaporeans' commitment to multi-racialism, and many Chinese suspecting that Malays have divided loyalties.

If the new account gains currency, it opens the door to a more positive, even idealistic, reading of the prospects for multi-racial harmony here. Yes, it calls for vigilance in building up multi-racialism -- but not paralysis.

The idealistic strand in the PAP government's origins has for decades been masked by Mr Lee's own unsentimental pragmatism.

He did not assume that a Singaporean Singapore was created with independence. He knew that different races had different characteristics and political proclivities.

With no patience for "political correctness" -- to use a contemporary Americanism -- he did not hesitate to point out stereotypical features of the various ethnic groups, and where they fell short of his expectations.

His better-safe-than-sorry mind-set led to ethnic quotas in public housing estates, laws allowing the Government to gag religious preachers, and a cautious approach towards Malays in military service.

Convinced that Singaporeans would tend to vote along ethnic lines, Mr Lee discounted Mr S. Dhanabalan from the prime ministership because he was Indian; and masterminded the GRC system of team MPs, to ensure minority representation in Parliament.

Such decisions were based on the realisation that nation-building needed time -- perhaps even generations -- and in the meantime, Singapore was vulnerable to the kind of ethnic pulls evident in the 1960s.

Since then, the Government has drummed into Singaporeans incessantly the need for vigilance in inter-racial relations.

But if people stopped there, it would not say much for the entire Singaporean enterprise.

A society devoid of trust, where ethnic conflict is engineered out of existence by physically dispersing minorities and curbing rights of speech and assembly, is nothing to shout about.

Mr Lee's memoirs reveal the roots of the PAP's instinctive suspicion: the rough back-street politics where the soft and naive could never survive.

But, thankfully, it goes beyond.

The book, and the carefully planned publicity around it, have turned the spotlight on the principled idealism of the PAP Old Guard -- leaders of all races who stood resolutely for multi-ethnic nationalism as one united people, regardless of race, language or religion, even before those words were penned in the pledge.

This should inspire Singaporeans of all colours and creeds to move forward towards closer ties, confident about their place in Singapore, and committed to removing vestiges of prejudice and unfairness wherever they see them.